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Abstract
Next generation mobile protocols have become very complex and it is becoming increasingly diﬃcult
for standards bodies to be sure of the correctness of protocols during the standardization process.
A convenient notation for specifying protocols and a means to analyze their behavior at a certain
level of abstraction could be quite useful. Model-checking has turned out to be an eﬃcient and
relatively easy-to-use technique in the veriﬁcation of formally described behaviors. However, there
are two major drawbacks in using model-checking: one is state explosion (the behavior models of
real-life programs tend to be extremely large); the other factor limiting industrial applicability of
model checkers is their restricted input language. For instance, in the ﬁeld of telecommunications,
the standards deﬁne the data model of the protocols using the ASN.1 notation and it would be
simpler if the veriﬁcation models could directly be built using this ’native’ data deﬁnition language
of telecommunication industry.
In this paper, we consider model checking the RLC protocol in the UMTS system that is seeing
ongoing development as a third generation mobile communication system. We brieﬂy describe
EASN, a model checker wherein the behavior can be formally speciﬁed through a language based
upon Promela for control structures but with data models from ASN.1. We discuss the veriﬁcation
problem for RLC and then discuss the results of using EASN on the veriﬁcation problem and
compare with Spin which also is the basis for the EASN realization.
As a side-eﬀect of realizing EASN, we have been able to locate some intricate performance bugs
in the Spin implementation. We believe that this type of “n-version” programming is necessary to
increase conﬁdence in model checkers.
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1 Introduction
Testing and debugging concurrent and reactive programs, such as communica-
tion protocols, is a tedious task, partly due to the nondeterminism caused by
the computation environment. If a program is described in a formal language,
then its behavior can be analysed by means of mathematical structures, such
as a reachability graph, which describes all the possible computation sequences
of the program.
If the correctness requirements of such a formally deﬁned program are also
speciﬁed using a mathematical notation, such as temporal logic [12], [1] or
state automaton [10], an algorithm called model-checker [2] can be used to
check whether the program honors its correctness requirements. The model-
checker goes through every possible computation sequence of the program,
thus it is said to be an exhaustive veriﬁcation technique. Since all the possi-
ble execution sequences are covered, model-checking gives total conﬁdence of
program correctness.
Model-checking has turned out to be an eﬃcient and easy-to-use tech-
nique in program veriﬁcation. However, there is one major drawback in using
exhaustive model-checking: behavior graphs of real-life programs, telecom-
munication protocols for example, tend to be extremely large. In literature
this problem is often referred to as state explosion. To alleviate this problem,
many progressive steps have been taken during the past decade and eﬃcient
implementations of model checkers are already available. Spin is one such
veriﬁcation system [4].
Next generation protocols for mobile devices have become very complex
and it is becoming increasingly diﬃcult for standards bodies to be sure of the
correctness of protocols during the standardization process. Thus it would
be extremely beneﬁcial if such techniques as model checking could be used in
ensuring the correctness of the standards.
Typically the input languages, such as Promela (used with the model
checker Spin), have a limited set of data structuring constructs. This can
be a limiting factor in the larger scale industrial usage of such tools. ASN.1
(Abstract Syntax Notation One) [5] is a widely used data deﬁnition language
in telecommunication protocol speciﬁcation. It would be helpful for the stan-
dardization process if a model checker could be augmented with ASN.1 data
modeling capabilities to check correctness of interim versions of a protocol be-
fore establishing a standard. Veriﬁcation engineers in the telecommunication
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industry would beneﬁt from this ability to use ASN.1 data models directly in
their veriﬁcation eﬀorts.
In this article we report on the application of the EASN model checker
to the Radio Link Control protocol [9] of the UMTS, a standard of the third
generation mobile communication systems [11].
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 describes brieﬂy the Spin
and EASN tools, and their relationship. In section 3 the RLC protocol is
described. Section 4 explains how the protocol and its user environment are
modeled, and discusses the results of the veriﬁcation. Conclusions are drawn
in section 5.
2 Spin, EASN and their Relationship
Spin [4] is an eﬀective model checking tool for asynchronous systems, espe-
cially designed for communication protocols. The input language of Spin is
called Promela (“Process Meta Language”). A protocol is modeled as a set
of Promela processes which communicate with each other with channels or
shared variables. The design of control constructs of Promela has been based
upon those in SDL, a language that has been used to specify communication
protocols since ’70s. Nondeterminism and guarded commands in Promela
make it convenient to express behavior of communicating protocol entities.
The model checker Spin has many capabilities like deadlock detection,
validating assertions, system invariants, detection of non-progress cycles and
livelocks, and specifying Linear Temporal Logic (LTL in short) properties for
model checking. Algorithms that eﬀect substantial space and time savings,
like bit-state hashing, on-the-ﬂy model-checking and partial-order reduction
have been incorporated into Spin. Hence, modifying the Spin system to handle
ASN.1 has been the design goal of the EASN Project [8].
Spin has a simulator that randomly checks only a portion of the state
space and also a (generated) validator that can attempt to exhaustively check
the state space of the system or can use techniques like bit-state hashing
to check a substantial portion of the state space with a fairly high level of
assurance. The EASN system also has these components, and most of the
reduction strategies in Spin, such as partial order reduction and bit-state
hashing, are already supported by the current version of EASN.
Similar to Promela in Spin, the EASN Language is the input language for
the EASN tool. The EASN language is designed as a convenient marriage
of the ASN.1 notation for data-typing and control constructs of Promela. In
case of conﬂicting features, the decisions were motivated from both ease and
convenience of implementation & elegance of language design.
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ASN.1 can be used to deﬁne the data-types and constant values in an
application. Promela, however, is a complete language with a set of basic data
types and typedef construct to help users compose data-types, and a set of
control constructs that can be used to deﬁne the behavior of protocol entities.
The EASN Language replaces all the data-typing capabilities of Promela
with ASN.1. Hence, none of the data types of Promela are retained in EASN,
except the chan construct. As ASN.1 has far more richer and expressive data
types compared to Promela, EASN needs to overload the semantics of many
of the operators of Promela, so as to support a natural set of operations on
data. In addition, the EASN language also augments the set of operators as
necessary. In brief,
EASN = Promela - {mtype, typedef, bit, byte, bool, short, int} + ASN.1
+ appropriately overloaded semantics of the existing operators + few new
operators.
In addition, due to the presence of the sub-typing mechanism in ASN.1,
which allows users to deﬁne data types such as integers having just a limited
set of possible values, model checking can be more eﬀective since the amount
of memory used in storing the system sates can be reduced and this naturally
helps in ﬁghting the state explosion.
Spin represents state quite eﬃciently but, for reasons of alignment, etc,
allows padding and other extraneous matter in the state vector. Since EASN
uses ASN.1 data models, it requires that all variables be as constrained as
possible in the space of values that they can take through the use of sub-
typing. For example, if an integer variable takes values from 8..15 only, it
can be represented using 3 bits. Further, if there are two variables that are
constrained to be between, say, 5..7 and 3..7, there are only 15 possibilities
and both can be represented in only 4 bits instead of either 2+3 (5 bits) or
worse 3+3 (6 bits). EASN, therefore, has a critical facility called the state
compaction infrastructure that guarantees that the minimal number of bits is
used in storing each system state.
3 The RLC-protocol
Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) is a third generation
mobile telecommunication system using WCDMA (Wideband Code Division
Multiple Access) radio access technique. The new radio access technique re-
quires major changes in the radio access network that consists of network
elements and protocols participating in the data transmission using the radio
interface. RLC (Radio Link Control) protocol is one of the new UMTS proto-
cols. It is a layer 2 protocol, according to the OSI reference model, providing
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Fig. 1. The UMTS protocol layers
reliable data transmission service to the upper layers over the unreliable radio
interface. It uses the unreliable data transmission service provided by a lower
layer, the MAC (Medium Access Control) protocol (see Figure 1).
RLC protocol was standardized in March 2000 by 3GPP, an international
standardization forum consisting of manufacturers, operators, authorities etc.
interested in regulation and development of the third generation systems. The
speciﬁcation [9] deﬁnes several services, functions and procedures for the pro-
tocol.
RLC provides to the upper layers several services related to data trans-
fer. According to the speciﬁcation [9], the protocol performs RLC connection
establishment and release, transmits data in transparent, unacknowledged or
acknowledged mode, allows setting of QoS (Quality of Service) dynamically
during data transfer and notiﬁes the upper layer of unrecoverable protocol
errors. In this paper, we concentrate on the veriﬁcation of the reliable data
transfer service in acknowledged mode. The acknowledged data transfer ser-
vice transmits upper layer PDUs (Protocol Data Unit) and guarantees delivery
to the peer entity.
The acknowledged data transfer mode has the following characteristics [9]:
• Error-free delivery: The receiving RLC entity delivers only error-free SDUs
(Service Data Unit, upper layer PDUs) to the upper layer.
• Unique delivery: RLC delivers each SDU only once to the receiving upper
layer by detecting duplicates.
• In-sequence delivery: RLC provides support for in-order delivery of SDUs,
i.e., RLC delivers SDUs to the receiving upper layer entity in the same order
as the transmitting upper layer entity submits them to RLC.
• Out-of-sequence delivery: Alternatively to the in-sequence delivery, it is
possible to let the receiving RLC entity deliver SDUs to the upper layer in
a diﬀerent order than delivered to it on the transmitting side.
• Ciphering: This service is not yet deﬁned in the speciﬁcation.
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• SDUs that do not ﬁt in a RLC-layer PDU should be segmented and again
reassembled at the other end of the protocol.
There are several alternative ARQ (Automatic Repeat reQuest) schemes
to choose from. We study stop-and-wait, perhaps the simplest one, for our
veriﬁcation model. Each SDU of the RRC layer above (which shall from this
on be alternatively called the user) has to be acknowledged before a new one
is accepted from the user, and in case RLC is unable to deliver the SDU
according to the requirements, it notiﬁes the transmitting upper layer entity.
For simplicity, we leave out the segmentation and re-assembly procedures.
The size of the user data, i.e. the size of a RLC SDU (Service Data Unit),
is assumed to be exactly the same as the size of the data ﬁeld in a RLC
PDU. Along with segmentation, concatenation and padding functionalities
can also be left out for simplicity. Since ciphering is not precisely deﬁned in
the standard, we have also left it out from our model.
The speciﬁcation deﬁnes some parameters for the conﬁguration message
used by the upper layer to establish and release a RLC connection. Parameters
are used to conﬁgure the RLC protocol entity to the appropriate mode and to
deﬁne parameter values used in ciphering and segmentation. Because we have
only one functional mode in our model and no ciphering or segmentation at
all, the parameters are left out from conﬁguration messages.
Connection establishment phase in RLC consists of receiving only a single
conﬁguration request message from the upper layer. After initialization, the
protocol is ready for the data transmission phase. We assume that the con-
nection is established (i.e. the corresponding message is received) at the same
time at both ends of the protocol. This is how the protocol is speciﬁed, since
at ﬁrst, the MAC and RRC protocols (see Figure 1) establish the physical
link and after that the RRC-layer sets up the RLC-connection. Thus, this
protocol is structured quite diﬀerently compared to the protocols in the OSI-
stack, where typically the layer n−1 connection needs to be set up before the
connection at level n can be established.
The data transfer procedure is initiated when an SDU is received from the
upper layer. For each SDU, the RLC protocol entity creates a corresponding
PDU. The SDU is placed into the data ﬁeld of the PDU with the appropriate
sequence number in the PDU header. A timer for the PDU transmission is
set right after sending the PDU to the MAC layer that takes care of accessing
the radio interface. No further requests are accepted from the user before the
data transfer procedure for the previous one is completed. The data transfer
procedure terminates either when the transmitting side receives an acknowl-
edgment for the PDU or, in an abnormal case, after sending a notiﬁcation of
a protocol error to the user. In the normal case, the transmitter receives the
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acknowledgment for the PDU before the maximum count of retransmissions.
A retransmission is triggered, usually, by the PDU transmission timer expi-
ration. The PDU transmission timer is reset when the acknowledgment with
the appropriate sequence number is received. Acknowledgments with other
sequence numbers are ignored.
After receiving a PDU, the RLC protocol entity in the receiving side re-
moves the header and delivers the SDU to the upper layer. After sending the
corresponding acknowledgment to the MAC, it updates the sequence num-
ber. The transmitting side updates the sequence number after receiving the
acknowledgment.
In the abnormal case where the sender’s PDU transmission timer expires,
and the predeﬁned maximum count of retransmissions for the PDU has already
been reached, the reset procedure is executed. Its purpose is to resynchronize
data transfer and bring the protocol back into a consistent state. The trans-
mitting side sends the reset message and sets a timer. The receiving side
acknowledges the message and updates the sequence number to a predeﬁned
initial value. In the transmitting side the sequence number is updated to the
same initial value right after receiving the acknowledgment for the reset mes-
sage. A maximum count of retransmissions is deﬁned for the reset messages
also. In case of a reset, the user entity is notiﬁed. If the reset procedure is
successful, a recoverable error is reported; otherwise, an unrecoverable error
is reported. It is then up to the user to decide how to continue. Disconnec-
tion phase, which is always initiated by the user entity consists of receiving
a disconnect message from the upper layer. For the same reason as for the
connection establishment, the disconnection also takes place approximately
simultaneously on both the transmitting and receiving sides. Both per con-
nection protocol entities terminate on receiving disconnection request, and
new entities will be generated for the next connection.
4 Formal Modeling and Veriﬁcation
Having informally described the RLC protocol, we now present the principles
of modeling of the protocol and its environment. In order to compare the
capabilities of the EASN system, we did the modeling and veriﬁcation for
both EASN and Spin.
The MAC-layer below the RLC-protocol provides an unreliable transfer
for delivery of RLC-level PDUs. Hence, we modeled MAC as two unreliable
FIFO-queues, one in each direction. When giving a PDU to MAC, it makes
a nondeterministic decision whether to deliver the message further (putting
it on the queue) or dropping it. However, we assumed that the MAC does
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not duplicate or corrupt the packets. Actually the corruption of a packet
is similar with respect to RLC as the dropping of a packet since the error
correction procedures below the RLC layer detect and reject the corrupted
messages.
For a new RLC-connection, a fresh logical channel is allocated for it in the
MAC-layer. In our model, when the the RRC-layer sets up a RLC-connection,
it ﬁrst dynamically creates a MAC-connection and then the two RLC entities
at both ends of the protocol, one of which is the sender entity and the other
is the receiver entity. So, in our model the RRC layer is modeled as two static
entities that then dynamically create the layers below.
As described in the previous section, the connection establishment takes
place at both ends of RLC at about the same time. In our model, this is
handled by the use of an ’oracle’ that commands both RRC entities to open a
RLC connection. Actually, it is the oracle that creates the underlying MAC-
layer, passing its handle to the RRC-entities. RRC-entities then create the
RLC-entities and pass them the MAC-handle which they use for connection.
The oracle is also used to model the fact that the RRC entities could decide
to terminate the RLC-connection at any point of time. If the sending RRC is
terminating the RLC-connection, this information is delivered to the receiving
RRC through the oracle.
In the real UMTS stack, the actual communication between the RRC-
entities happens through a separate MAC connection. We use the direct
synchronization of using an oracle as an intermediary in order to simplify the
model. So, the oracle has a dual role in our model: it is the means of control
communication between the RRC-layers, and incorporates control from the
upper level application protocol to decide when an RLC connection should be
created or terminated.
The structure of the model is depicted in the Figure 2, where the static
entities are drawn with solid line and the dynamic ones with dashed line. The
oracle and its signals are drawn with dotted line.
Each separate protocol entity is modeled as a EASN-process. The behavior
of RLC sender and RLC receiver processes are sketched in extended state
automaton form in the Figure 3 and 4. In both the processes, a reception of the
disconnecting message from the above layer causes an immediate termination,
that is left out from the automata descriptions. In the ﬁgures, transitions are
speciﬁed in guarded command fashion, e.g., fromrc?CR ⇒ ab := 1 means
that when receiving a CR message from user, the value of ab is set to 1. MAC
layer is speciﬁed with two separate unreliable FIFO-buﬀers, one from sending
RLC entity to receiving entity and one for the other direction.
Full speciﬁcation in both EASN and Promela format can be located at
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Fig. 2. Structure of the speciﬁcation
num==ab
−>ab++
num!=ab
−>cnt++
cnt==MAX
−>cnt=0
−>to_rrc!statusUE; ab=1
to&&cnt==MAX
ab=1
from_rrc?DT(sdu)
cnt=0
to_mac!data(sdu,ab)
−>cnt++
to && cnt<MAX
to_mac!reset
to&&cnt==MAX
−>cnt=0
−>cnt++
to && cnt<MAX
from_mac?ack(num)
−>to_rrc!statusRE; ab=1
from_mac?resetack
sending
idle
reset
ready
from_rrc?CR
Fig. 3. RLC sender
idle
from_rrc?CR
−> exp=1
num==exp
−> exp++
ready
from_mac?reset
−> to_mac!ack(num)
from_mac?data(sdu,num)num!=exp
to_mac!resetAck
−> exp =1
Fig. 4. RLC receiver
http://www.cs.helsinki.fi/u/mluukkai/easn/ .
One speciﬁc interesting point in the modeling has been the usage of dy-
namic process creation and passing channel identiﬁers of the dynamically cre-
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ated processes; these two features are supported by both Spin and EASN. In
this aspect this model diﬀers from the previous two reported in [6], [3] that
used labeled transition system speciﬁcations and a static structure where the
same RLC and MAC components are reused for the subsequent connections.
The model of the RLC-protocol here follows the one deﬁned in the standard
closely, since in reality diﬀerent MAC-connections do not share logical chan-
nels.
The actual way of modeling the dynamic aspects is the following:
(i) At the start, three processes are created: the oracle, sending user and the
receiving user.
(ii) Before starting a RLC-connection, the oracle creates a MAC-entity.
(iii) The MAC entity deﬁnes four local communication channels, two for both
of the peer RLCs, and passes the channel identiﬁers to the oracle.
(iv) The oracle then passes the channel identiﬁers to the RRC entities which
then start a RLC-connection setup.
(v) Both the RRC entities then create RLC-entities, passing the correspond-
ing MAC-channel identiﬁers to the created processes.
(vi) At the time of disconnection, both the RLC-entities and the MAC en-
tity terminate. During the termination, the channels between MAC and
RLCs also vanish, since those were locally deﬁned in the process that
modeled MAC.
(vii) For the next RLC-connection, oracle starts all over again.
The above modeling is possible due to the capability of the Promela or
EASN modeling languages to dynamically create processes and pass channel
identiﬁers between the processes. From the veriﬁcation point of view, it is
also important that the terminated protocol instances do not have any eﬀect
on the current state components of the systems. That is actually the case
if termination happens as in our model, where it is ensured that old entities
have terminated before new ones are generated.
Properties to be Proved and Veriﬁcation Technique
have any eﬀect on the behavior of the protocol, a deadlock possibility
should exist after sending a list of n SDUs, each consisting of just a number
0. So, if we are able to show that the protocol does not deadlock for any
possible list of sent SDUs containing zeros, the protocol is free of deadlocks in
a general case where SDUs of any content are sent.
Detection of message duplication Let us assume that it is possible
that protocol duplicates the i:th SDU when sending a list s1, s2, . . . , sn of
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torlc!DataReq(sdu)
torlc!DataReq(sdu)
fromrlc?DataAck fromrlc?DataAck
fromrlc?DataAcksdu = 0
sdu = 1
Fig. 5. RRC sender entity for veriﬁcation of in-sequence delivery
SDUs. So, the receiving user would be given SDUs s1, . . . , si, si, . . . sn. The
contents of the SDUs do not have any eﬀect on the behavior of the protocol.
Thus in case of sending the list of SDUs 0i−110n−i (ﬁrst 0 repeatedly i − 1
times, then 1 and ﬁnally n − i times 1), the SDU consisting of the value 1
would be delivered to the receiving user twice. So, if we are able to show that
the protocol delivers exactly one SDU having content of 1 for any possible
list of SDUs sent of the form 0i10j, the protocol in general does not duplicate
SDUs when SDUs of any content are being sent.
In-sequence delivery of messages Let us assume that it is possible
that the protocol could change the order in which i:th and i + 1:th SDUs are
delivered when sending a list s1, s2, . . . , sn of SDUs. So, the receiving user
would be given SDUs s1, . . . , si+1, si, . . . sn. Since the contents of the SDUs do
not have any eﬀect on the behavior of the protocol, in case of sending the list
of SDUs 0i1n−i, the ﬁrst SDU consisting of 1 would be delivered before the
last one consisting of 0. So, if we are able to show that the protocol delivers
all the SDUs consisting of 0 before any consisting of 1 for all possible lists of
sent SDUs of the form 0i1j , the SDUs are received in the same order in which
they were sent for a general case where SDUs of any content are being sent.
The veriﬁcation itself was conducted by modeling the RRC sender entity
in such a way that it sends the required type of SDUs, and in the RRC
receiver we then checked that the received SDU stream is of right type. As an
example, a fraction of the RRC sender for the in-sequence delivery veriﬁcation
is shown in the Figure 5. So, ﬁrst it sends SDUs with 0 as content and then,
nondeterministically at some point of time, it begins sending SDUs with 1
as content. In this way, the reachability graph will contain executions where
every list of SDUs of the type 0i1j is considered.
Results of Veriﬁcation
We veriﬁed successfully all the properties of interest with several diﬀerent
values for the maximum number of retransmissions. The tables below summa-
rizes some of the performance measures of the veriﬁcation both for EASN and
for Spin when verifying an equivalent model of RLC protocol. The measure-
ments listed are depth of the DFS-search, size of the state vector (in bytes),
number of states and transitions, usage of memory (in Mega-Bytes), and time.
The results are reported separately for the various veriﬁcation options which
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are (see [4] for a more speciﬁc description for the various options):
• Noreduce, meaning that the default optimizations in the size of the stored
state vector are turned oﬀ,
• Bitstate, Holzmann’s bit-state hashing method for approximating the set
of reached states, and
• Collapse, Wolper’s hash compact method for approximating the set of
reached states.
Table 1
The deadlock detection
Options depth State States States Transi Total Time Tool
Vec Stored Matched tions Mem. (real)
size (MB) (m:s)
NoReduce 3307 52 116042 193407 309449 8.515 0:6.666 Easn
3307 152 116042 193407 309449 10.870 0:2.065 Spin
1646 52 54928 38812 93740 5.215 0:2.115 Easn
1646 152 54928 38812 93740 6.239 0:0.663 Spin
NoReduce 3307 0 115601 192508 308109 1.129 0:4.383 Easn
BitState 3311 152 115747 192800 308547 1.129 0:1.420 Spin
BitState 1638 0 54805 38703 93508 1.813 0:1.446 Easn
1538 152 54709 38555 93264 1.813 0:0.476 Spin
Collapse 1646 28 54928 38812 93740 4.703 1:54.781 Easn
1684 152 55195 38876 94071 5.318 0:0.920 Spin
NoReduce 3307 28 116042 193407 309449 7.695 7:34.387 Easn
Collapse 3345 152 116327 193517 309844 9.129 0:2.917 Spin
As can be seen from the tables, EASN uses at most the same amount
memory that Spin uses, but as the sizes of the veriﬁcation models grow, EASN
performs increasingly better than Spin, on memory-usage. We have noticed
upward of 20% better memory performance from EASN, over Spin. The price
it has to pay is the increased run-times.
In crafting EASN from Spin, certain portions of the Spin source that have
to do with encoding of state and its management have been completely re-
written for EASN, thereby making it possible to see improvements in its mem-
ory performance. This approach was consciously chosen, rather than simply
translate ASN.1 types to appropriate Promela-types. The fact that this new
code-component in EASN has not evolved as well, or for as long as the code
from Spin that it replaces into EASN, shows (rather clearly) in its run-times.
EASN employs Integer-Arithmetic for its computation of the hash-value
corresponding to its representation of the reached-state of the system, through
the use of the GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Package. Spin, on the other
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Table 2
Detection of message duplication
Options depth State States States Transi Total Time Tool
Vec Stored Matched tions Mem. (real)
size (MB) (m:s)
NoReduce 1231 52 301314 649312 950626 19.677 0:16.673 Easn
1231 156 301314 649312 950626 26.742 0:5.849 Spin
673 52 61164 36835 97999 5.522 0:2.225 Easn
673 156 61164 36835 97999 6.956 0:0.736 Spin
NoReduce 1231 0 299023 644079 943102 1.129 0:10.693 Easn
BitState 1231 156 298021 642265 940286 1.129 0:3.777 Spin
BitState 673 0 61136 36828 97964 1.813 0:1.517 Easn
673 156 61002 36731 97733 1.813 0:0.492 Spin
Collapse 673 28 61164 36835 97999 4.908 2:7.880 Easn
673 156 62380 37016 99396 5.830 0:0.956 Spin
NoReduce 1231 28 301314 649312 950626 17.424 61:2.117 Easn
Collapse 1231 156 302530 649493 952023 22.441 0:8.552 Spin
Table 3
In-sequence delivery of messages
Options depth State States States Transi Total Time Tool
Vec Stored Matched tions Mem. (real)
size (MB) (m:s)
NoReduce 1232 52 242596 529114 771710 16.092 0:13.773 Easn
1232 156 242596 529114 771710 21.929 0:4.648 Spin
674 52 48022 28983 77005 4.703 0:1.741 Easn
674 156 48022 28983 77005 5.830 0:0.536 Spin
NoReduce 1258 0 241163 525797 766960 1.129 0:8.868 Easn
BitState 1232 156 236052 515455 751507 1.129 0:2.985 Spin
BitState 674 0 48005 28975 76980 1.813 0:1.208 Easn
674 156 47969 28955 76924 1.813 0:0.395 Spin
Collapse 674 28 48022 28983 77005 4.294 1:19.238 Easn
674 156 48918 29117 78035 4.908 0:0.759 Spin
NoReduce 1232 28 242596 529114 771710 14.352 36:56.357 Easn
Collapse 1232 156 243492 529248 772740 18.345 0:6.868 Spin
hand, employs Polynomial-Arithmetic for the same purpose. While Polyno-
mial arithmetic can be faster than multi-precision integer arithmetic, the lat-
ter allows EASN to compute hash-values incrementally. In the accompanying
tables, notice that EASN reports a state-vector size of 0 bytes, for the Bit-
State runs as against non-zero values reported by Spin. For these runs, Spin
ﬁrstly represents the reached-state of the system in a contiguous byte-array,
and then computes two integer indexes based upon that, into a bit-array, and
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sets the bits at the two indexes per reached state. EASN, through its use
of incremental computation for the two indexes (from those corresponding to
the state that the system was in prior to evolving into its current state), does
not require to represent the reached-state explicitly. Refer [7] for a complete
discussion of the various design decisions, and their rationale, as well as the
related implementation aspects of EASN.
Even though this RLC case-study is not a large one, we have observed that
EASN simpliﬁes the formal speciﬁcation of large telecommunication protocols
or systems, since it involves one (manual translation) step less (as against
when using Spin), of having to model the ASN.1 data through the use of
Promela types.
“N-version” Programming: SPIN and EASN systems
Since the code base of EASN is derived from Spin system with changes in
the state vector representation and handling (an important and critical part
of the model checker), any discrepancy in the number of states, etc. in the two
systems can be explored to determine the underlying causes. Such an eﬀort
has revealed the following anomalies in the Spin system when working with
the RLC model presented here.
• When using rendezvous channels, the compression mask was not completely
restored on backward moves during the search. The correctness of the search
was not aﬀected, but the number of reached states became larger than
necessary. This has been ﬁxed in Spin 3.4.6 (29 March 2001).
• In the s-hash function, the computed hash value would incorrectly also
examine up to 3 extraneous bytes of the state vector argument. This some-
times led to the re-exploring of some states.
5 Conclusions
In this article veriﬁcation of the UMTS Radio link control protocol [9] has been
considered. This protocol implements several modes of operation. For the
veriﬁcation, we selected the reliable data transfer service in the acknowledged
mode. The protocol was modeled and veriﬁed using Spin, and EASN [7], our
Spin [4] based model checker for telecommunication systems. In EASN, the
data aspects of the protocol are modeled with ASN.1 [5] while the control
structures are the same as that of Promela (Spin’s input language). In order
to compare EASN’s performance with that of Spin, we ran the veriﬁcation in
both the systems. The data obtained from veriﬁcation indicated that with
increase in the running time, EASN can manage with less memory than Spin.
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The more complex data-types, and data-structures of EASN contribute to its
increased run-times.
We have already reported veriﬁcation of some aspects of the RLC protocol
in [6] where we veriﬁed the simpliﬁed version of the protocol, one where the
disconnection phase was not considered. In the earlier work we used labeled
transition system based modeling of the protocol. Within that framework,
dynamic creation of processes used here is not easy, so despite our earlier
model lacks the disconnection phase, it is slightly more complex than the
one we developed here. Furthermore, the dynamic aspect of the modeling
describes the ’reality’ more closely, so we believe it to be an extremely useful
feature of both Spin and EASN systems.
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